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note), and Titchener also, admit the existence of feelings without the pleasant-unpleasant dimension. It is interesting to speculate upon the theoretical modifications likely to follow concessions of this kind, such possibly, for example, as dimensionless feelings, since all of the other Wundtian possibilities have already been rejected by this school.

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Time-Relations of the Affective Processes. TAIZO NAKASHIMA. *Psychological Review,* N. S., Vol. XVI., No. 5, September, 1909. Pp. 303-309.

The purpose is to test the time of affective arousal and the dependence of affective intensity upon the duration of the stimulus.

For colors the shortest time ranged from .84 to .98 second, and for geometrical figures, .72 to 1.08 second. The feeling arousal always followed the sensory arousal. The time sense was very definite and there were few cases of mixed feelings. The reaction time, for complex visual impressions also, proved to be somewhat longer than the cognitive reaction time, for simple colors it being considerably so. Practise shortened the time a good deal, although only a slight effect was noticeable for tones.

The conclusions from this testing of the time relations in the different sense departments, and their relations to the physiological expressions, are as follows: These judgments are as immediate as sensory judgments of psycho-physics; the time-relations, aside from being invariably longer, show relatively the same variability as those of sensory; the method of reaction is here similarly applicable; the time relations of affective to sensory processes vary in the different sensory fields, being close in the tactual and olfactory senses and remote in the color sense; and all vary with the variation of the stimulus.

The two ways of accounting for the longer time necessary for the affective arousal are sharply contrasted. One view is, that affection is a definite resultant of a sensation, sensation-idea, or idea complex, and that it is experienced after these complex processes have been consummated (his own interpretation of Münsterberg). The other view (Titchener's) is that the delayed appearance of feeling is due primarily to its lack of distinctness, reinforced by the further fact that affective judgment in complex sensory or apperceptive states is reached as quickly or more so than in the purely sensory cases. The author prefers the latter, although he does not deny affective clearness and affective attention.

The similarly possible directness of judgment in affective as well as in sensory process is stressed as a point of kinship. One feels that the author, maybe unconsciously, is nevertheless trying by some other than a direct exhaustive introspective method, or at most by a sort of nose-counting tabulation of answers, to establish qualitative likeness here. The way they objectively seem to act after measuring their tardy time of entering consciousness (as compared with sensory process), even if figures should show such absolute similarity or identity in behavior, would in no sense invalidate their absolute qualitative unlikeness.

We have certainly an introspectively clear case of qualitatively disparate and unlike mental elements or functions. It may be due to the reviewer's incorrigibly prejudiced attitude, but he can not see how the real feeling problem is illumined by these experiments, bolstered up as they are with such respectable methods; nor can the reviewer altogether agree with the interpretation of the data given, feeling, perhaps unwarrantably, that the writer too easily relegates what some of his subjects call "feelings" to his own category of "emotions" or organic or kinesthetic sensations, or that he too easily and too surely speaks of his own subjects' "alleged" qualitative differences in simple affections, or too lightly perhaps of "mixed feelings," by each one of which rejections hangs a controversy.

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La mémoire affective et l'expérimentation. TH. RIBOT. *Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique.* Juillet–Aout, 1909, IV. Pp. 289–292.

Külpe at the recent Philosophical Congress at Heidelberg reported certain results of an experiment planned to verify Wundt's tridimensional theory of feeling. These unpublished results constitute the topic for this discussion by Ribot.

Külpe's experiment consisted in gathering under defined conditions introspective data from seven subjects. The four series were as follows: (1) The reproduction of certain sense feelings, (2) the reproduction of certain more complex sensuous situations, (3) the reproduction of certain types of complex emotions, and (4) the attempted placing in memory of the emotional experience aroused by unknown but expressive portraits.

The results were that four subjects could reproduce excitement and tension, but not pleasantness and unpleasantness. One thought that she experienced a genuine feeling image of pain or pleasure, but tended to confuse the reproduced excitement and tension with kinesthetic sensations. The other two occasionally evoked affective images, although in one case it was difficult to distinguish the feeling from its image. Both reproduced excitement and tension. All seven could reproduce pain and distinguish it from displeasure. Several thought that the affective image lost none of its original intensity. Recalled pleasantness and unpleasantness seemed to some very real, to others hallucinatory. In the fourth series the subjects did not appear to be able to refer the revived feeling to any particular former experience.

There is clearly nothing conclusive from these data. Ribot would naturally expect a greater range of individual differences than one would find in intellectual memory. Nevertheless he concludes that, very likely, as artists and designers can throw most light on the visual type of imagery, and musicians on the auditory, so we should possibly find distinguishable affective types who could possibly best clarify for us the workings of the affective recall. As is well known, Ribot believes both in the conservation